Caremark duty
The Delaware duty of oversight (In re Caremark, 1996), under which directors must in good faith establish a reasonable information-and-reporting system and not consciously ignore the warnings it produces; located within the duty of loyalty by Stone v. Ritter (2006), which is why an oversight breach is not shielded by a charter exculpation clause.
Defined in 2 GAGE programs, which carry 2 distinct definitions of it. The wording above is taught in Certified AI Practitioner: Workplace Foundations.
How each discipline defines it
The same term does different work depending on who is using it. These are the definitions as each program teaches them, unedited.
The Delaware duty of oversight (In re Caremark, 1996), under which directors must in good faith establish a reasonable information-and-reporting system and not consciously ignore the warnings it produces; located within the duty of loyalty by Stone v. Ritter (2006), which is why an oversight breach is not shielded by a charter exculpation clause.
The Delaware Court of Chancery's 1996 standard requiring a board of directors to make a good faith effort to establish a reasonable system for monitoring and reporting on risks the company considers central to its business.
Where it is taught
The exact lessons this term appears in. The first module of every program is free with a free account.
- Board-Level AI Governance · Bonus: AI Leadership Accelerator, Certified AI Practitioner: Workplace Foundations
- Internal Corporate Alignment: CEO, Board, Legal, and Engineering · Compliant Influence Architecture, The AI Lobbyist: Certified AI Policy Strategist
Terms it appears with
Not an alphabetical neighbourhood: these are the terms taught in the same lessons, ranked by how often they appear together.